Does digital ID actually make us safer, or just more watched?
A massive digital ID rollout can give governments powerful new surveillance tools without making people safer. Nigeria's National Identification Number (NIN) program, backed by over $430 million in World Bank funding, enrolled more than 121 million citizens by June 2025 and forced everyone to link their SIM cards to their national ID [1]. Despite this huge expansion of state data-collection capacity, kidnapping for ransom and armed banditry actually intensified during the same period, with independent monitors documenting thousands of victims [1]. The paper's authors conclude that security agencies gained unprecedented surveillance capacity but lacked the training, inter-agency cooperation, and analytical tools to turn that data into actionable intelligence [1].
The problem isn't just a Nigerian one—it's a pattern. The same study found that the digital ID project served the interests of technology vendors, state agencies, and political elites far more than citizens, and it systematically excluded rural and marginalized populations [1]. In other words, building the infrastructure to watch everyone doesn't automatically build the ability to protect them.
How do platforms and governments use digital ID to watch us?
Digital identity systems aren't just neutral databases—they function as platforms that can enable surveillance by design. One researcher argues that the core platform properties of digital identity systems—like requiring registration to access benefits—force users into a binary choice: either register and be profiled, or give up essential services [2]. This isn't a 'dark side' that can be fixed later; it's built into the very structure of these systems [2].
Even systems marketed as privacy-protecting, like self-sovereign identity (SSI) wallets, can shift power in ways that increase vulnerability. A critical analysis of Europe's push for EU-wide SSI found that instead of empowering citizens, these systems put individuals—especially non-citizens—in a more vulnerable position by embedding existing power imbalances into the technology [5]. The same paper notes that SSI carries promises of user-centricity and self-sovereignty, but its real-world implementation doesn't address the historical shortcomings of identity systems [5].
Can digital ID ever be designed to protect privacy, not threaten it?
Some digital identity systems are explicitly designed to limit surveillance, but even these face serious challenges. The GA4GH Passport standard, for example, creates a machine-readable digital identity that conveys only specific roles and data access permissions—called 'visas'—rather than sharing a person's full identity [4]. This system is used by major research organizations like ELIXIR Europe and the U.S. National Institutes of Health to manage access to sensitive biomedical data, and it provides transparent mechanisms for authorizing data access across platforms [4].
However, the term 'self-sovereign identity' itself is confusing and can be misleading. A typology of five SSI wallet projects from 2021-2022—including efforts by Jack Dorsey's Block company, Meta, Twitter, the European Commission, and the German government—found that the same term is used to describe very different technologies and ethical principles [3]. This semantic confusion makes it hard for users to know what they're actually getting, and some systems that claim to be privacy-protecting may still enable surveillance [3].
About These Sources
This answer is built on 5 peer-reviewed studies — published from 2021 to 2026, 1 from 2024 or later, 3 in Q1 journals, collectively cited 83 times — selected as the most relevant from 5 studies that passed quality screening, drawn from 39 papers retrieved from a database of over 500 million.
Sources used in this answer
Political Economy of Digital Identity Systems and National Security Governance in Nigeria
Nigeria's biometric ID program enrolled over 121 million citizens with $430 million in World Bank funding, but kidnapping and armed banditry worsened during the same period; security agencies gained surveillance capacity but lacked training and coordination to use it effectively [1].
Digital identity as platform-mediated surveillance
Digital identity systems function as platforms whose core properties—requiring registration to access benefits—force users into a binary of being profiled or losing essential services, making surveillance an inherent feature, not a side effect [2].
Digital Identity Wallets and their Semantic Contradictions
A typology of five self-sovereign identity wallet projects from 2021-2022 (including Block, Meta, Twitter, EU Commission, and German government) found that the term 'SSI' is used for very different technologies and ethical principles, creating confusion about privacy protections [3].
GA4GH Passport standard for digital identity and access permissions
The GA4GH Passport standard creates machine-readable digital identities that convey only specific data access permissions ('visas'), and has been implemented by ELIXIR Europe, NIH, and the Autism Sharing Initiative to manage access to sensitive biomedical data [4].
Digital Identity Infrastructures: a Critical Approach of Self-Sovereign Identity
EU-wide adoption of self-sovereign identity does not address historical shortcomings of identity systems and instead puts individuals—especially non-citizens—in a vulnerable position, despite promises of user empowerment [5].